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AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTIONS: THE
SUBSEQUENT REPAIR RULE IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION
Should evidence of repairs performed after an accident be
admissible in a lawsuit as proof of negligence or culpable conduct?
For example, an elderly woman trips on a large crack in a grocery
store sidewalk, which causes her to fall and break her arm. Assum-
ing there is a trial, it is generally accepted that evidence of a post-
accident repair is not admissible to prove the negligence of the gro-
cery store in failing to maintain the sidewalk properly.' There are
many diverse views, however, on the wisdom of either admitting or
excluding evidence of subsequent repairs as proof of negligence.2
This comment proposes that subsequent repair evidence should be
admissible to prove negligence. Specifically, this comment will
demonstrate that the social policy for excluding such evidence has
been undercut by the various exceptions to the so-called "repair
rule." s To substantiate this position, this comment will begin with
a brief overview of the historical and theoretical justifications for
the repair rule. This will be followed by an examination of subse-
quent repair decisions in Montana which show that the exceptions
to the repair rule have weakened the social policy. Finally, Maine
Rule 407(a),4 which admits subsequent repair evidence as proof of
negligence, will be offered as an alternative for Montana.
1. Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Hart v. Lanca-
shire & Y. Ry., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261 (Ex. 1869); FED. R. EviD. 407; 2 WIGMOK ON EVIDENCE
§ 283 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 275 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1959);
Annot., 170 A.L.R. 7 (1947).
2. See, e.g., Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
371 (1979); Soo Hoo & Soo Hoo, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL. DAvIS L. Rzv. 421 (1976); Field, The Maine Rules of Evidence: What
They are and How They Got That Way, 27 MR. L. REv. 203 (1975); Comment, The Repair
Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Mea-
sures in Proving Negligence, 27 Ms. L. REv. 225 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Repair Rule];
Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule of Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7
FORUM 1 (1971); [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Ad-
missibility, 10 RuTGas L. Rav. 574 (1956).
3. The rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures is known by several
names. For purposes of this comment, the term "repair rule" will be used to refer to the
exclusions of all post-accident remedial measures.
4. ME. R. EVID. 407(a).
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II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE REPAIR RULE
A. Historical Justifications for the Repair Rule
Early decisions, both English and American, indicate that ex-
cluding evidence of subsequent repairs as proof of negligence was a
settled rule of evidence. In Hart v. Lancashire & Y. Ry.,5 Baron
Bramwell noted that the repair rule eliminated the notion that
subsequent repairs tended to prove the repairer was negligent. Ac-
cording to the Baron, the law rejects the idea that "because the
world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.",
Similarly, in Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.,7 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court concluded that evidence of subsequent re-
pairs was inadmissible in any case as proof of prior negligence.8
The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of the
repair rule when it stated:
But, it is now settled, upon much consideration, by the decisions
of the highest courts of most of the states in which the question
has arisen, that the evidence is incompetent because the taking of
such precautions against the future is not to be construed as an
admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate ten-
dency to prove that the defendant had been negligent before the
accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the
jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the
defendant.9
These early court decisions reflect strong opposition to the
5. 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261 (Ex. 1869).
6. Id. at 263. Baron Bramwell prefaced this often-quoted statement as follows:
I agree with the Lord Chief Baron and my Brother Brett, and confess that I can-
not see any evidence of negligence in this matter. Although I have no desire to
occupy time unnecessarily, I think there are matters of considerable importance
involved in this particular case. One of them is, that people do not furnish evi-
dence against themselves simply by adopting a new plan in order to prevent the
recurrence of an accident. I think that a proposition to the contrary would be
barbarous.
Id.
7. 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358 (1883). Accord, Sappenfield v. Main Street R.R., 91 Cal.
48, 27 P. 590 (1891); Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303, 78 P. 710 (1904).
8. Morse, 30 Minn. at 468, 16 N.W. at 359. The court's rationale for excluding evi-
dence of subsequent repairs was based upon the need to encourage repairs:
A person may have exercised all the care which the law required, and yet, in the
light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, and as a
measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards. The more care-
ful a person is, the more regard he has for the lives of others, the more likely he
would be to do so, and it would seem unjust that he could not do so without being
liable to have such acts construed as an admission of prior negligence.
Id.
9. Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
[Vol. 42
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admission of subsequent repair evidence, and conclude that a per-
son should be able to adopt additional safeguards without having
such acts construed as an admission of negligence. From these ori-
gins evolved the modern day justifications for the exclusion of
post-accident repairs.
B. Modern Day Justifications for the Repair Rule
Two reasons generally given for the exclusion of subsequent
repair evidence as proof of negligence are: (1) the evidence is not
sufficiently relevant to the issue of negligence to allow its admis-
sion; and (2) the evidence would, by its admission, discourage
owners from performing the necessary corrective measures. In ana-
lyzing the first reason, Professor Wigmore notes that prior negli-
gence cannot consistently be inferred from evidence of subsequent
repairs.10 Rather, the inference derived from the repair indicates
only that the object was capable of causing the injury. This is con-
sistent with the belief that the injury may have been caused by
accident or by contributory negligence, rather than by the owner's
negligence."' Consequently, evidence of subsequent repairs may
not be relevant to the issue of negligence and, according to Profes-
sor Wigmore's analysis, should be excluded.
The second and most predominant reason offered for exclud-
ing evidence of subsequent repairs is the social policy of encourag-
ing, or at least not discouraging, remedial safety measures by po-
tential defendants.' 2 This argument has also been analyzed by
Professor Wigmore:
That argument is that the admission of such acts, even though
theoretically not plainly improper, would be liable to over-empha-
sis by the jury, and that it would discourage all owners, even
those who had been genuinely careful, from improving the place
or thing that caused the injury, because they would fear the evi-
dential use of such acts to their disadvantage; and thus not only
would careful owners refrain from such improvements, but even
careless ones, who might have deserved to have the evidence ad-
duced against them, would by refraining from improvements sub-
ject innocent persons to the risk of the recurrence of the injury.13
Full implementation of this social policy would result in evi-
dence of subsequent repairs always being excluded. However, this
10. WIGMORE § 283(4).
11. Id.
12. MCCORMICK § 275.
13. WIGMORE § 283(4) (emphasis added).
1981]
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is not the law today. Evidence of subsequent repairs might be ad-
missible under one of the exceptions to the repair rule. Recall the
elderly woman who tripped on the grocery store sidewalk. Evi-
dence of the post-accident repair may be admissible: (1) to prove
ownership or control of the premises where the injury occurred; (2)
to show feasibility of the precautionary measure; (3) to impeach a
witness; or (4) to show the physical conditions existing at the time
the accident occurred.
1 4
Professor McCormick has recognized that the admission of
subsequent repair evidence for other purposes could defeat the
predominant social policy."5 He warns courts to consider carefully
the possibility of excluding such evidence when appropriate:
It is submitted that before admitting the evidence for any of
these other purposes, the court should be satisfied that the issue
on which it is offered is of substantial importance and is actually,
and not merely formally in dispute, that the plaintiff cannot es-
tablish the fact to be inferred conveniently by other proof, and
consequently that the need for the evidence outweighs the danger
of its misuse.1"
Nonetheless, the exceptions to the repair rule have undermined
the social policy of encouraging repairs by presenting relevant evi-
dence related to such other purposes to the trier of fact. Conse-
quently, the repair rule is prevented from effectively achieving its
goals.' 7 Additionally, there seems to be increasing liberality in ad-
mitting subsequent repair evidence under an exception to the rule.
This trend is prevalent in Montana as well.
III. THE MONTANA TREATMENT OF SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS
On July 1, 1977, the Montana Rules of Evidence became effec-
tive by Supreme Court Order No. 12729 for all trials after that
date.'8 As a result, Rule 407, which excludes evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures as proof of negligence or culpable con-
duct, is now the law in Montana,"e and conforms with the majority
position. 0 Montana Rule 407 states:
14. These are the most widely recognized exceptions to the repair rule. For more dis-
cussion, see Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Safety Measures, 37 TEXAs
L. REv. 478 (1959).
15. McCORMICK § 275.
16. Id.
17. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 6.
18. 34 St. Rptr. 302A (1976).
19. MONT. R. EvID. 407.
20. See, e.g., N.J. EVID. R. 51 (1971); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1968); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-451 (Vernon 1964). It is worth noting that in California section 1151 has been
[Vol. 42
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When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control,
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
21
Montana Rule 407 is identical to Federal Rule 407 and was
intended to promote the same social policy.22 For analysis, the sub-
sequent repair decisions in Montana may be divided into pre-Rule
40723 and post-Rule 407 categories. Pre-Rule 407 decisions in Mon-
tana have consistently admitted evidence of subsequent repairs
under an exception to the repair rule, as have many decisions
based upon the federal rule.24 This trend continued after the adop-
tion of Rule 407, which simply codified the exceptions to the repair
rule.2 5 An examination of subsequent repair decisions in Montana
shows that the exceptions have been applied more frequently than
the actual repair rule and, as a result, the social policy is no longer
a persuasive reason for denying the admission of subsequent repair
evidence as proof of negligence.
held inapplicable in actions against manufacturers based on strict liability in tort. Ault v.
International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
21. MoNT. R. EvID. 407.
22. Commission Comment to Mowr. R. Evm. 407.
23. Montana subsequent repair decisions prior to the adoption of Rule 407: Lawlor v.
County of Flathead, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 751 (1978); Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling
Co., 138 Mont. 427, 357 P.2d 4 (1960); Titus v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 47 Mont. 583,
133 P. 677 (1913); Pullen v. City of Butte, 45 Mont. 46, 121 P. 878 (1912); May v. City of
Anaconda, 26 Mont. 140, 66 P. 759 (1901); Leonard v. City of Butte, 25 Mont. 410, 65 P. 425
(1901).
24. See, e.g., Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen K.K., 455 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1972) (upheld the
admission of subsequent repair evidence to show the physical condition existing at the time
of the accident); Powers v. J. B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964) (upheld the
admission of subsequent repair evidence to show control); Steele v. Wiedemann Machine
Co., 280 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1960) (upheld the admission of subsequent repair evidence to
show the physical condition existing at the time of the accident); Johnson v. United States,
270 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1959) (upheld the admission of subsequent repair evidence to show
the feasibility of the repair); Fine v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 163 F.Supp. 231 (D. D.C. 1958)
(evidence of subsequent repairs admitted to show the physical condition existing at the time
of the accident).
25. MoNT. R. EVID. 407. Note, however, that the language of Rule 407 is not all inclu-
sive regarding the exceptions to the general rule: "This rule does not require the exclusion
of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving own-
ership, control or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment."
(emphasis added.) Therefore, a purpose other than those enumerated may qualify as an
exception and allow the subsequent repair evidence to be admitted, so long as that purpose
does not prove or tend to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
1981]
5
Harney: Subsequent Repair Rule
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
A. Pre-Rule 407 Case Law
One of the earliest subsequent repair decisions in Montana is
May v. City of Anaconda.' In May, the plaintiff sustained injuries
when the wagon he was driving after dark collided with a boulder
in the street. Evidence was presented by the plaintiff that the city
removed the boulder from the street following the accident. The
Montana Supreme Court ruled that such evidence was inadmissi-
ble to show negligence on the part of the city in failing to remove
the boulder prior to the plaintiff's accident. The court, however,
also ruled that evidence of the subsequent removal was admissible
to show that the portion of the street where the accident occurred
was under control of the city.2" Consequently, an exception to the
repair rule prevailed, and the evidence was admitted.
A similar result was reached in Pullen v. City of Butte. 8 This
case arose after the plaintiff received injuries from tripping on a
six-inch uprise in a city sidewalk. The defendant contended that
the trial court erred in allowing a witness to answer a question re-
garding the repair to the uprise after the accident. Objection to the
immateriality of the question was overruled by the trial judge and
the witness was allowed to respond. On appeal, the Montana Su-
preme Court upheld the action of the trial judge, stating that the
question tended to show the physical conditions existing at the
time the accident occurred 2 ' The court cautioned, however, that
"[gireat care should be exercised,. . . in admitting this sort of tes-
timony and in guarding against its effect, lest the jury get the no-
tion that evidence of subsequent changes or repairs is evidence of
confession of prior negligence."30 The supreme court reversed the
trial court decision, however, and ruled in favor of the defendant
on other grounds.8 1
PuUen v. City of Butte involves two significant points. First,
the supreme court admitted evidence of subsequent repairs and
justified the admission under an exception to the repair rule. Sec-
ond, the supreme court realized that the policy of the repair rule
26. 26 Mont. 140, 66 P. 759 (1901). The earliest subsequent repair decision in Mon-
tana is Leonard v. City of Butte, 25 Mont. 410, 65 P. 425 (1901), where the Montana Su-
preme Court permitted evidence of lack of accidents after the repair, thus bringing in the
fact that a repair was made. This, coupled with the numerous accidents before the repair,
was held to be a proper question for the jury on the issue of causation. This may be an
additional exception to the repair rule in Montana.
27. May, 26 Mont. at 144, 66 P. at 761.
28. 45 Mont. 46, 121 P. 878 (1912).
29. Id. at 54, 121 P. at 879.
30. Id. at 53, 121 P. at 879-80.
31. Id. at 57-58, 121 P. at 881.
[Vol. 42
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could easily be defeated by admitting evidence of subsequent re-
pairs. Both points illustrate the weakness of the repair rule. Not
only did an exception to the rule admit the evidence, but, once
admitted, the danger existed that the jury would view the evidence
as a confession of prior negligence.
This same result was reached in Titus v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co."' In Titus, the trial court admitted evidence of repairs
performed by the defendant following an accident in which the
plaintiff injured his hand on an engine bracket. The Montana Su-
preme Court upheld the decision of the trial judge because the
subsequent repair tended to show the physical condition of the en-
gine bracket on the day of the injury.38 As in May and Pullen, the
evidence was admitted under an exception to the repair rule.
Evidence of subsequent repairs was admitted in the form of
photographs in Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling Co.3 4 The plaintiff
was employed to haul water from a tank maintained by the defen-
dant. Because the tank was without a water gauge, the plaintiff
had to climb a ladder to the top of the tank in order to check the
water level. This was done by peering into a hole on the top of the
tank. Since the ladder ended at the top of the tank, the plaintiff
had to grab hold of a metal coupling attached to a rubber hose and
swing himself on top of the tank. The plaintiff alleged that prior to
the accident, the defendant painted the water tank and loosened
the coupling. As a result, when the plaintiff climbed the ladder and
grabbed the coupling, it came loose in his hand, causing him to fall
and sustain serious injuries. During the trial, the court admitted,
over the defendant's objection, three photographs of the water
tank taken one year after the accident. The plaintiff's foundation
testimony for the admission of the photographs consisted of the
changes in the water tank from the time of the accident to the
time the photographs were taken. These changes included a metal
pipe in place of the rubber hose and the installation of a water
gauge on the tank. The Montana Supreme Court ruled that the
foundation testimony for the admission of the photographs was
properly received by the trial judge. 6 Specifically, the court relied
on the rule in McNair v. Berger," which stated that when photo-
graphs are admitted into evidence, it is acceptable to explain any
changes from the time of the accident to the time the photographs
32. 47 Mont. 583, 133 P. 677 (1913).
33. Id. at 588, 133 P. at 678.
34. 138 Mont. 427, 357 P.2d 4 (1960).
35. Id. at 440, 357 P.2d at 11.
36. 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834 (1932).
1981]
7
Harney: Subsequent Repair Rule
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
are taken.8 7 Thus, evidence of subsequent repairs was again admit-
ted under an exception to the repair rule.
The final subsequent repair decision prior to the adoption of
Rule 407 is Lawlor v. County of Flathead.38 In Lawlor, rebuttal
testimony regarding repairs made to a highway under the jurisdic-
tion of the county was excluded by the trial judge. The Montana
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and admitted the subse-
quent repair evidence. First, the court ruled that the evidence
should have been admitted as an exception to the repair rule to
show the physical conditions existing at the time of the accident.3'
Second, the court ruled that the plaintiff's rebuttal testimony
should have been admitted for impeachment purposes on the feasi-
bility of repair. Both justifications are exceptions to the repair
rule." °
It is worth noting that Titus v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.
and Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling Co. involved the admission of
subsequent repairs performed by a private party, while May v.
City of Anaconda, Pullen v. City of Butte, and Lawlor v. County
of Flathead involved the admission of subsequent repairs per-
formed by public entities. In either instance, the evidence was ad-
mitted, which indicates that both private and public defendants
are treated equally by the Montana Supreme Court. 1
B. Post-Rule 407 Case Law
Two subsequent repair cases have been decided since the
adoption of Rule 407, and the similarities with pre-Rule 407 cases
are significant. One case involved a defendant who was a public
entity, while the other case involved a defendant who was a private
party. Most importantly, the Montana Supreme Court admitted
the subsequent repair evidence under the exceptions to the repair
rule.
In Cech v. State of Montana,4 ' the plaintiff sued the state for
failing to place a guardrail along a certain stretch of highway prior
37. Id. at 460, 15 P.2d at 838. Cf. supra note 25 (exceptions to the repair rule are not
limited to those specifically enumerated in Rule 407).
38. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 751 (1978).
39. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 755.
40. Id.
41. This is not to suggest that private parties and public entities should have been
treated differently from each other by the Montana Supreme Court. Rather, the fact that no
special favoritism was shown to one or the other by the court indicates that the exceptions
to the repair rule were applied to both evenly. The trend toward widening admission is not,
therefore, limited to one class of defendants only.
42. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 97 (1979).
150 [Vol. 42
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to an automobile accident which fatally injured the plaintiff's wife
and son. The state contended that the trial judge erred in admit-
ting evidence of subsequent repairs taken by the state following
the accident. Specifically, the state objected to the admission of a
request for an emergency study which resulted in the construction
of a guardrail along the portion of the highway where the accident
occurred. The Montana Supreme Court upheld the trial court deci-
sion for two reasons. The court first determined that the construc-
tion of the guardrail and the supporting memorandum recom-
mending the construction were proof of the feasibility of the
repair.43 Second, the court noted that during the trial, the state's
expert witnesses testified that the lack of a guardrail conformed
with acceptable standards, and that a recovery area, such as the
one where the accident occurred, was a preferable method of pro-
tecting vehicles leaving the highway." The supreme court held
that, under Rule 407, the construction of the guardrail was admis-
sible to impeach these contentions by the state."
The most recent subsequent repair decision in Montana is
Runkle v. Burlington Northern.46 In Runkle, the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the trial judge committed prejudicial error
in excluding evidence that automatic warning signals were in-
stalled at a railway crossing subsequent to a fatal accident.4 7 Rely-
ing upon Cech and Lawlor, the court ruled that the evidence was
relevant to show the feasibility of repair.48 In addition, the court
said that the evidence was admissible to impeach a witness for the
defendant who testified that the railway crossing was not
ultrahazardous. 49
In all the cases just discussed, subsequent repair evidence was
consistently admitted under the exceptions to the general rule.60 In
effect, the general rule now stands to be applied only as an excep-
tion to the exceptions. Recognizing this problem in its own juris-
diction, the State of Maine has adopted a rule which admits evi-
43. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 102.
44. Id. at __ 604 P.2d at 100.
45. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 102.
46. - Mont. -, 613 P.2d 982 (1980).
47. Id. at _ 613 P.2d at 987.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. But cf. Morrison v. City of Butte, 150 Mont. 106, 115, 431 P.2d 79, 84 (1967) (sub-
sequent repairs to snow removal equipment excluded because "such evidence should not be
admitted."); Hackley v. Waldorf-Hoerner Paper Co., 149 Mont. 286, 297, 425 P.2d 712, 718
(1967) (subsequent repair evidence excluded because not a proper case for admission).
1981]
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dence of subsequent repairs as proof of negligence.
IV. RULE 407(a): MAINE'S APPROACH TO SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS
By virtue of the Evidence Enabling Act of 1974,51 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine promulgated the Maine Rules of Evidence.
Effective February 2, 1976,52 Rule 407(a) completely repudiated
the traditional repair rule, making Maine the only jurisdiction to
admit evidence of subsequent repairs as proof of negligence.8
Maine Rule 407(a) states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent remedial measures is admissible."
The proponents of Maine Rule 407(a) felt that the social pol-
icy encouraging owners to make repairs was no longer persuasive.
The proponents also recognized that the repair rule had become so
flawed by exceptions that its value had diminished.55 One propo-
nent of Maine Rule 407(a) has offered three justifications for the
admission of subsequent repair evidence as proof of negligence."
The first justification is based on the fact that the social policy has
51. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-A (Supp. 1975).
52. ORDER ADOPTING MAINE RuLs OF EVIDENCE, effective February 2, 1976, 336-343
A.2d Me. Rptr. XL (1974-75).
53. Prior to Maine's repudiation of the repair rule, Kansas was the only jurisdiction
which allowed such evidence. The Kansas position concerning subsequent remedial mea-
sures evolved from a reliance on logical analysis to a reliance on precedent.
For example, early Kansas case law admitted evidence of subsequent repairs which was
probative of negligence. In Atchison v. Retford, 8 Kan. 245 (1877), the Kansas Supreme
Court ruled that the jury had the right to consider evidence that the defendant railway
company moved its track away from a coal chute after the plaintiff collided with the chute.
Such evidence was deemed to have probative value.
In Emporia v. Schmidling, 33 Kan. 485, 6 P. 893 (1885), Kansas moved slightly away
from the probative value approach. Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that evidence
of subsequent repairs was admissible only to show the physical condition of the premises at
the time of the accident. The same result was reached in St. Louis & S.F.Ry. v. Weaver, 35
Kan. 412, 11 P. 408 (1886).
Judicial reliance on precedent was especially highlighted in Harter v. Atchison, T &
S.F.Ry., 55 Kan. 250, 38 P. 778 (1895). The court cited Retford, Emporia, and Weaver and
held that evidence of subsequent repairs was admissible only to show the defect existing at
that time of the injury.
In short, probative value fell victim to precedent in Kansas. Evidence of subsequent
repairs became inadmissible except as evidence of the physical condition at the time of the
accident. In 1963, Kansas joined the majority of jurisdictions by adopting a statutory repair
rule. For more discussion, see Repair Rule, supra note 2.
54. ME. R. EVID. 407(a).
55. See Repair Rule, supra note 2.
56. Id. at 235-36.
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been undermined by the many exceptions to the repair rule"' At
least one critic of the repair rule has commented that no statistical
data has been compiled to prove that the rule has either en-
couraged or discouraged repairs by owners." The second justifica-
tion proposes that the social policy will be more effectively imple-
mented by admitting subsequent repair evidence as proof of
negligence.9 Unlike the status of the social policy under the repair
rule, a rule similar to 407(a) promotes public safety without sacri-
ficing relevant evidence on the issue of negligence. The risk of fu-
ture liability incurred by a failure to repair, coupled with the ad-
mission of similar occurring accidents in a later lawsuit on the
issue of negligence, is offered as a more effective means of encour-
aging repairs.
60
The third and most significant justification offered for the ad-
mission of subsequent repair evidence as proof of negligence is the
probative value of the evidence. To prove negligence, a plaintiff
must satisfy four elements:a' (1) a duty requiring the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach of duty and the
injury to the plaintiff; and (4) actual harm or loss to the plaintiff's
interest. To determine the defendant's duty, there must be a risk
of harm which is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Propo-
nents of Maine Rule 407(a) contend that subsequent repair evi-
dence is especially probative of these elements.
Risk of harm has been defined as a "danger which is apparent,
or should be apparent, to one in the position of the actor."' Sub-
sequent repair evidence is probative of the existence of risk of
harm at the time the accident occurs. This is not a novel proposi-
tion. Early Kansas decisions recognized the probity of such evi-
'dence in proving a defect or risk of harm.6 For example, in Empo-
ria v. Schmidling," evidence that the city replaced an old sidewalk
with asphalt after an accident was admitted on behalf of the plain-
tiff. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the evidence could be
considered by the jury as tending to show the defect at the time of
the accident. Thus, evidence of subsequent repairs is probative of
57. As indicated earlier, this is especially true in Montana.
58. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 6.
59. Repair Rule, supra note 2, at 243-44.
60. Id.
61. PROSSER ON TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
62. Id. at § 31.
63. See note 54 supra.
64. 33 Kan. 485, 6 P. 893 (1885).
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the risk of harm when the injury occurs.65
According to Dean Prosser, the risks of harm must be "suffi-
ciently great to lead a reasonable man in his position to anticipate
them, and to guard against them."" In short, the risk of harm
must be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as a reasonable
person. Thus, if the plaintiff can show by evidence of subsequent
repairs that the risk of harm would have been perceived by a rea-
sonable person, the evidence is relevant to the issue of duty. In
Otts v. Brough,67 for example, the plaintiff was injured after he fell
into an opening in a concrete floor. Immediately after the accident,
the opening was barricaded. The Idaho Supreme Court held that
such evidence was relevant to the defendant's recognition of a de-
fect which he had a duty to repair. Consequently, the evidence was
relevant to the issue of negligence and was a proper matter for con-
sideration by the jury."
The defendant is still left with some measure of protection,
however. Subsequent repair evidence with low probative value and
a prejudicial effect on the jury will be excluded by the trial judge
under Rule 403."' Subject to this limitation, evidence of subse-
quent repairs is relevant to the issue of negligence since it is help-
ful in determining risk of harm and the foreseeability of that risk
by the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Because Rule 407, in its present form, cannot achieve its social
policy, it is time to examine an alternative like Maine Rule 407(a).
Not only does such a rule better promote public safety, but it also
insures that relevant evidence on the issue of negligence is
presented to the jury. The adoption of a similar rule in Montana
65. To a limited extent, this already exists in Montana. In Lawlor v. County of Flat-
head, - Mont. -, 582 P. 2d 751 (1978), Titus v. Anaconda Copper Co., 47 Mont. 583,
133 P. 677 (1913), and Pullen v. City of Butte, 45 Mont. 46, 121 P. 878 (1912), evidence of
subsequent repairs was admitted to show the physical conditions at the time of the accident.
The only difference between the Montana and Kansas approach is that the Kansas Supreme
Court recognized the probative value of the evidence, while the Montana Supreme Court
admitted it as an exception to the repair rule.
66. PROSSER § 31.
67. 90 Idaho 124, 135, 409 P.2d 95, 101 (1965).
68. Id.
69. MONT. R. EvID. 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence.
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